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GENERICS AND NEW GOODS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE INDEXES
ABSTRACT
We examine the issue of new goods and price indexes for theimportant and
tractable case of generic and branded drugs. By treating genericsas entirely
distinct goods and "linking them in" to indexes with fixed weights, the standard
price indexes fail to reflect the substantial welfare gains to those consumers
who, like the FDA, regard generic and branded versions of a drug as being
perfect substitutes. We discuss the treatment of heterogenous consumers in
constructing aggregate price indexes, and then, using detailed data on wholesale
prices of two anti-infective drugs, present calculations of various alternatives
to the official indexes.These reflect both heterogeneity of tastes for
brandedness, and also the empirically important phenomenon of diffusion of
generic drugs into the market following patent expiration. We findvery
significant differences: for one of the drugs studied, the standard price index
roseby14% over the sample period, while our preferred alternative index fell
by 48%.
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and NBERI. Introduction
This paper discusses the current treatment ofthe introduction of
generic versions of previously patented (and branded)drugs into the
official price indexes and suggests some alternativeways of proceeding.
While generic pharmaceuticals are the substantivetopic, the problem
discussed is of much wider importance. It isa special and possibly "easy"
case of the more general problem of new goods andquality change,
where different quality versions are interpretedas new goods. In trying to
solve the general quality change problem, officialstatistical agencies may
unintentionally aggravate and overdo it, by defining commoditiestoo
narrowly and treating each new variety as a new good. Becausenew
goods are usually "linked-in" rather than compareddirectly to the
previous versions, the explicit and implicit price declines thatconsumers
experience as the result of theft appearance do not showup in the official
indexes, ever. And generic pharmaceuticalsare just the visible tip of a
very large iceberg. A comparable problem exists, for example, in the
treatment of the changing population of outlets in whichvarious goods are
sold. The whole supermarket revolution and the riseof various discount
and self-service outlets has left almostno trace in the official statistics of
prices and productivity (see, e.g., Reinsdorf (1993)).
Generic phannaceutica]srepresent a particularly simple version
of the "new goods problem". Ageneric drug is a variety of a previously
existing commodity which a governmentagency, in this case the FDA,
certifies as being "(bio-)equivalent" to thepreviously available version. It
differs only in packaging, including the inertmatter enclosing the active
Iingredients, in labelling, and provenance.'At this point two extreme
approaches are possible. The firsttakes the FDA at its word and says that
a pill, is a pill, is a pill,the relevant price being the average price of all
pills sold for the same purpose.The other extreme, the current position of
the statistical agencies, treats it as an entirely separate commodity,not to
be compared to previously existing versions.The fict that not all
consumers treat them as fully equivalentand switch immediately to the
newly available cheaper variety provides some supportfor the second
position. But the resulting exclusion of any gainsfrom the appearance of
such new versions of old (and also new) goods leaves theofficial
measures potentially badly biased in a worldwhere such changes are the
rule rather than the exception.
'Federal Drug Administration publishes a list of ApprovedDrug
Productswith Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, which provides
definitive therapeutic equivalence evaluations of multisource prescription
drug products. Equivalence between branded and generic drugsis a hotly
debated topic. Products certified as therapeutically equivalent" by the
FDA are: (1) pharmaceutically equivalent, in that they contain the same
active ingredient(s), are of the same dosage form, are identical in strength
and mute of administration, and meet applicable standards of purity,
quality etc.; (2) bioequivalent, in that in vivo or in vitro testsshow that a
product meets statistical criteria for equivalence to the reference drugin
the rate and extent of absorption of the active ingredient and its
availability at the site of action; (3) adequately labelled; and (4)
manufactured in compliance with Current Good Manufacturing Practice
regulations. Therapeutically equivalent products may still vary in
characteristics such as shape, color, flavor, scoring, packaging, labelling,
and shelf life. These apparently trivial factors may still influence the
clinical effectiveness of the drug insofar as they affect patients' ability to
distinguish between different tablets and dosages, or their readiness to
take the medicine at the times and in the amounts prescribed. Therapeutic
equivalence ratings also do not take into account differences in stability
under adverse storage conditions, or possible reactions by patients to
coloring or preservative ingredients.
2Let us start with a brief, stylized description ofwhat has been
happening with generic pharmaceuticals in recentyears: When a patent
expires, several generic versions, certified by the FDA to be"perfect"
substitutes, appear very quickly, selling at much lowerprices, about 30 to
50percentcheaper than the original versions. The incumbents, theowners
of the branded and previously patented versionusually do not reduce their
price, loosing much of their market share in quantities, butkeeping a
respectable share in market revenues. This response isprobably optimal
for them.2 Often, there is additionalentry of generic firms and the
average generic price drops further within the first twoyears after entry,
to something around 25 percent of the original price of theincumbent, or
lower, which is presumably close to the long run marginalcost of
production and distribution.
Tables I and 2 show these developments forcephalexin and
cephradine, two systemic anti-infectives from theCephalosporin family of
antibiotics. These drugs are widely used fortreating conditions such as
ear infections and respiratory tract infections. In 1986, theyear before
these two drugs went off patent, the wholesale sales ofcephalexin
(Keflex) reported in our data were just under $280m, while wholesale
sales of cephradine (Velosef) were just under $40m.By 1989, total annual
wholesale revenues from the sale of cephalexin had fallento $163m and
cephradine sales were down to $17.4m (current dollars) with therevenue
2 See Caveset al. (1991). Obviously the above is an oversimplified
version of a much more complex subject. For earlieranalysis and richer
detail see Masson and Steiner (1985), Grabowski andVernon (1992), and
Hurwitz and Caves (1988). The changes in market share andrelative
prices in our data are consistent with the results of thesestudies, which
report on larger numbers of drugs.
3shares of incumbent firms (Eli Lilly and Squibb respectively) atabout
50%.
Figure1 plots the numbers for a particular cephalexin
"presentation": a specific formulation of the drug in a specific package.
What is interesting for us in this figure is both the fact of rather large
price differentials between the incumbent and entrants,and that not all
consumers switch to the new cheaper variety, in spiteof these
differentials. For the latter to make sense, consumers must differ in their
expectations about the efficacy and quality of such substitutes, despite
what the FDA says, some of them preferring to pay much higher prices
for the branded version.3 It is the presence of heterogeneous consumers
with different tastes which sustains the presence of many such varieties in
the market, but standard consumer theory is rather uneasy with this fact.
We invent the concept of the "representative" consumer, who consumes a
bit of every variety, taking two generic and one branded pill a day. The
more relevant notion of a population of heterogeneous consumerswith
different tastes requires some redefinition of the standard index number
theory. We turn to this task and a brief discussion of new goodsin price
index theory next.
'In this paper we are abstracting from the rather vexing problem of
who is the "consumer" in the medical market. Who makes the decision:
the patient or the doctor (or pharmacist) as his agent? And also who pays
for it? Given insurance and reimbursements, it is not clear that standard
consumer theory applies in this case. But the problem exists alsooutside
the medical arena: we pay more for milk at the "convenience" store, and
established names such as Leica can command significant premia over
competing products whose quality differentials are rather hard to discern.
Thus the treatment of such cases is of general interest even though the
particular application of the theory to pharmaceuticals is somewhat
ambiguous.
4IL Aggregate Index Numbers




where E(p,u) is the minimum expenditure required by individualii to
achieve the base utility level it givenpricesp.4 Acomparable aggregate
Idealprice index can be defined as theweightedaverage of such
individual indexes:
E(p',uk°)=zw:Jko Ep0,u)
where w; =E(p°,u°) pOq°
is the relative share of individual h in
E(p"451'°Q°
total base period expenditures. The resulting Idealaggregateprice index
3° gives the minimumamount(relative to base period 0) that a social
planner would need to have so that he could keepevery individual on his
base utility level under the new price circumstances.5 Define the
operational Laspeyres price index at the individual level as =pq,
pqh
and the parallel aggregate Laspeyres price indexas P° =w°P°, then
masectionborrows heavily from Fisher and Griliches (1992).
'The resulting index is "plutocratic" rather than"democratic", with
individuals getting unequal weights in theaggregate. See Diewert (1983)
for discussion and references to the earlier literature.
S:
The same argument also applies to the parallelPaasche computations and
hence P ￿ F' where us a comparableIdeal index holding the utility
level constant at is'.Thisprovides some justification for viewing the
standard aggregate price index computations as approximatingsomething
of interest despite the underlying fact of consumer heterogeneity.
m.NewGoods, New Varieties, and the SpeeinlCaseof Generics
We now introduce the problem of new goods, commodities (or
services) that were not available in period 0, forwhich we have no
observations on p° and where q°=O,presumably.The theoretical answer
to this problem is well known (see Fisher and Shell (1971)and (1972)):
estimate the reservation price of the new commodity in period zero, i.e.,
the price in period zero at which the demand for this particular
commodity (or version) would be zero.' If such a reservation pricecould
be estimated, or a reasonable assumption about it could be made, the rest
would be easy".
Note that the new goods problem does not affect the calculation
of the Laspeyres price index, since the base period expenditure weightof
the new good is zero. However, a better approximation to thef Ideal
index might still be possible. We shall come back to this point below.
6 arediscussing the problem of measuring a consumer price
index. The problem of a producers (output) price index is similar. It is
discussed in Section XIIofthe second essay in Fisher and Shell (1972).
For more recent references on this range of issues see Feenstra (1992)
and Zieschang (1989).
6Having a reservation price does allow us to calculatea Paasche price
indexandalso the associated Fisher's Ideal index, thesquare root of the
product of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes. Onecan also calculate the
"superlative" (in Diewert's terminology) Divisia-Tornqvistindex, where
the percentage price decline from the reservationprice will get a weight
of half of the share of the new good in thecomparison period. In general,
however, if the new good is introduced into the price indexearly enough
then, exceptinspecial cases, such as we will discuss below, itsweight
will be verysmall,and the whole argument is de,ninimis. Sucha
procedure assumes, however, that the market is in equilibrium andthat
everyone who would have liked to switch to the new commodity had the
opportunity and the knowledge to do so in the first minuteor month of its
existence. If, in fact, the introduction and diffusion ofnew goods into a
market takes some time, as does the learning ofconsumers about its
actual and putative qualities, then the theoreticalprescription "introduce it
early and you will minimize the problem"may be all wrong, and so also
the procedures outlined above. One cannotreally escape the diffusion
problem. In some form one has to face it head on and discuss whatare
the relevant points in time for which suchcomputations are indeed
sensible. We will, therefore, get back to thisproblem below. But first we
shall deal with the related questions ofestimating the reservation price and
dealing with taste heterogeneity.
Assume, for the moment, that we know the reservationprice p,
for every consumer. Then theaggregate Paasche price index is
QPb'+Qp
a
7where the subscripts b andgrefer to brand and generic respectively, and
=qpis the avenge reservation price of those individuals who
boughtgenericsin period 1, weighted by the size of their purchases, with
capital Qdenotingaggregatequantities.Other price indexescanbe
defined in a similar fashion.
Assuming that a consumer buys either the branded version or the
generic, we are in a two goods world and we can model thechoice
between them in a "linear utility" framework: generics are chosen by
individual h if Pb>O +bk,wherebk is the premium required by
individual ii when purchasing generics to compensate him for the putative
loss in security or quality associated with this switch. The associated
component of the utility function that is being maximized can bewritten
as q+ (l—bk)q where ô =bk/pbis the premium for 'brandedness"
relative tOp and p" =Pb
—
bkdiffers for each h. Individual h is then
indifferent between buying the branded version or the generic if for her
P =Pg'If she switches to a generic, it must be the case that a price
decline of p, -p,occurred.7
Given this interpretation, we can construct a better bound for the
1"Idealaggregate price index, even though the standard Laspeyres
formula does not incorporate the presence of the generic since its weight
in period zero is zero. Knowing that the consumer would have been
indifferent between consuming the branded item at Pborthe generic at Ph'
'Thebrand premium bk need not be constant over time. It could
change with the availability of other substitutes or with the passage of
time as the uncertainty about the quality of generics dissipates.
8in the base period, we choose the latterconsumption point as our
reference point, since it is on the same base-periodindifference curve,
and construct a Laspeyres-like index(assuming that total quantities did not
change with only previous brand variety usersswitching to the generic):'
nQpQp'
since for each individual the relevant pricechange 5pb'/Pb° if he did not
switch and p,'/p if he did. The first set of individualsare weighted by
the value of their consumption in the baseperiod, while the second, the
shifters, are weighted by their potential consumption ofgenerics evaluated
at their reservation prices. Perhaps notsurprisingly, the resulting Ideal
aggregate Laspeyres index turns out to be exactly equal to the Paasche
index. Given that the assumed utility function islinear, the two indexes
are the same and the aggregate Paasche, in reservationprices, is
'exact'.9
IV. Reservation Prices
'This is approximately correct for most ofour examples, with the
market expanding effect of the drop inaverage prices counterbalanced by
the general decline in the overall market for thedrug, since patent
expiration comes usually relatively late in the life-cycle ofa drug when it
is already loosing market share tonewer, more advanced drugs.
'This equiva]ence holds for the sub-index forthe "nest' of these
particular goods. It will not be necessarily true for the overallindex,
including other goods since is0andis'willdiffer.
9The main problem, of course, is where are these reservation
prices to come from? For versionsthat differ along some measured
characteristics, one could estimate the potential supply price of the new
variety given yesterday's technology, using thehedonic price indexes
approach (see Griliches (1971) and (1990), Suslow (1992)))0But in the
case of generics all the relevant measurablecharacteristics are presumably
the same. In our case it is not that the goods differ but that consumers
differ in their perceptions of their relative values, in their L. Since the
probability of shifting to a generic depends Ofl Pb -p,> bb, one can
write the share of generic users in the total ass, F(bJ, whereF() is
the cumulative distribution of reservation prices (for a fixed Pb).
Assumingthat bh ￿ 0, i.e., that bh is a non-negative random variable, no
consumer being willing to pay more for a generic version than for a
branded one if the branded one is available, the average reservation price
for the switchers is bounded between Pbandp, and depends onthe shape
of Fe'))' It is possible either to assume a reasonable shape for F() or
try to infer it from the observed relationship between pricesand market
share.
Suppose that the distribution of brand preferences is constant and
exogenous, and that equilibrium is reached instantly. Asthe price
differential widens, the entrants' market share should just trace out the
tO The hedonic approach does not give, however, enough credit to the
appearance of new varieties if their prices fall on the oldhedonic price
line. On this see Trajtenberg (1990).
"In this, the generics case differs from the more general "another
variety" case in being hierarchical and asymmetric. In a sense, generics
are perceived, at least to some extent, as lower quality versions. If we
allowed bk to take negative values, we would be in the more general but
also less informative case.
10shape of FQ. 12IfF() is uniform the relationship will beexactly
linear. Other possibilities are unimodal distributionssuch as the normal or
logistic, implying the familiar S-shaped c.d.f. On theother hand, the
distribution could be bimodal (u-shaped p.d.f.) suchas the arcsin or other
variations on the beta distribution, with mostconsumers having a very
weak or very strong preference for the brandedversion, implying an
'inverted S' shape for FQ. The simplestassumption for F() is the
uniform distribution: then theaverage reservation price for those that
shifted is just halfway betweenPb and p,. To the extent that the uniform
distribution over-estimates the tails of the normalor logistic, we will be
over-adjusting the price indexes. On the other hand, if thetrue
distribution is bimodal (u-shaped) we will beunder-adjusting.
Unfortunately, our ability to distinguish between these
alternatives is limited by several factors. There isthe question of
diffusion: in most of the cases examinedso far the entrants rapidly gain
significant market share in the first few months afterpatent expiration
without a concomitant movement in theprice differential. From a
practical perspective, it is also clear that the curvature of thec.d.f.'s of
12Thesize of the initial price differential and its evolutionover time
are presumably determined by the outcome ofsome game between the
incumbent and the entrants. The standard verticaldifferentiation models
(e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982) are greatly simplified here:"quality" is
either zero or one, and (at least forsome drugs) it is not unreasonable to
assume that all consumers have to buy either the brandor the generic,
which makes moot the issues relating to 'finiteness' andcoverage of the
market discussed in the theoretical literature. But theimplications of
alternative assumptions about the distribution ofpreferences for
brandedness for the equilibrium in these modelsare difficult to draw out.
Exact closed form solutions for even thesimplest game are very difficult
to obtain except for the uniform case. Themost tractable alternative
seems to be to simply segment the market into two distinctelastic and
inelastic segments, see Frank andSalkever, (1991).
11
Aplausible distributions is verysimilar over the range of price differentials
thatwe actuallyobserve. The initial price differential is normally quite
large, so that we rarely see theleft hand tail of the distribution (whichis
in any case confoundedwith thediffusion effect) and entrants' prices
rarely fall far enough for us to see the extreme righthand tail. The
portion which is actually observed by usis approximately linear for most
candidate distributions. In these circumstances we settle upon theunifonn
distribution as a "reasonable" assumption.
An alternative approach, which comes out of the recent literature
on preferences for variety and differentiated productmarkets (see Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977), Spence (1976), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and
Feenstra (1992)), takes the reservation price as infinite but assumes a CES
form for the utility function over varieties and produces a finite consumer
surplus calculation arising from the introduction of a new one. It canbe
shown (see Anderson et al. (1992)) that the linear random utility model
with varying tastes across individuals is observationally equivalent to a
representative individual CES utility function, though the welfre
implications can differ. In our case, and also in the case of the
introduction of a new shirt or cereal variety, the assumption of an infinite
reservation price seems both unreasonable and unnecessary. More
generally, however, if the functional form of the demand structure over
the various varieties can be estimated, then a reservation price could be
computed, and the implicit utility function could be derived to producethe
appropriate "exact" price indexes. (See also Berry (1991) for a more
general approach to the estimation of the unobserved "quality" of a
particular variety using the information contained in its market share.) We
shall try to illustrate such approaches below, using both the CES and the
addi-log demand structures.
12V. Official Indexes and Mteniatiyes
There are a number of problems with thetreatment of generics in
the official price indexes:
I. Generics belong to the more general class of "newgoods" which
are introduced relatively late in their life cycle into the official
market "baskets". Even when baskets arechanged more often,
e.g. currently in the PPI and CPI on a four-five year rolling
basis, this turns out to be too long a lag inmany dynamic
markets, especially because new goods tend toexperience
significant price declines in the earlier part of their lifecycle."
2. Because of the fixed weight aspect of the official indexesand the
growing market share of generics, they are underweightedeven
when included.
3. Because they are linked-in, rather thancompared directly with
the previously existing versions, and treatedas entirely "new"
goods, none of the direct price decline experienced by those
consumers who switch to generics is reflected in the officialprice
indexes.
Problems one and two are 'standard" and well known,though
nonetheless very important. It is the last problem which forms themain
topic of this paper
In Figures 2 and 3, we plot a selection of possibleprice indexes
for the drug cephalexin, which went offpatent in April 1987. (Figures 4
and 5plotthe same indexes for cephradine. The basic dataare given in
'Foradditional evidence and discussion of this, see Bemdt et al.
(1992), and Triplett's discussion in Foss et al. (1993).
13the top and bottom linesof this figure: the price series forthe (average)
brand and generic versionsof this drug.'4 The "BLS" index attempts to
approximate the outcomeof the official PPI procedures. Theofficial PPI
was based on a basketof drugs chosen in 1981. It was rebasedin January
1988, using informationcollected in 1987 (and earlier) on value shares to
sample individual products (seeBemdt et al. for details). Thus we "link-
in" generics at 88.01 into a Laspeyres typeindex, with a relative weight
of 0.27, their revenue share duringthe first quarter of their availability in
mid- 1987.15
The "ELS" index is to be compared to a"standard" Tornqvist-
Divisia index given next, which maintainsthe spirit of the official
approach, by treating generics as newcommodities without making any
direct price comparisons, but brings themin the second month after their
entry and keeps shifting their weight asthey gain market shares. Note that
the "EU" index departs from it both becauseit is late in including
'4These already represent a significant summaryof the data. The
incumbent's series are a Tornqvist-Divisia PriceIndex based on 28
distinct "presentations" of this drug at the monthlylevel. The generics
price series is computed similarly, butwith information from a changing
number of manufacturers (3 in the month after the patent expired,rising
to an average of about 30) selling between them27 distinct presentations
used in the calculation of the price index. This indexis linked in at 87.05
using the average price differential between genericand branded versions
at that date in the presentations where both were available,weighted by
the total market shares of these presentations. The finalnumbers are not
very sensitive to the fine details ofthis construction, as a look at the
particular version of this drug, in Figure 1,indicates.
This is probably already an overestimate of what EU mighthave
been able to do at the time, both because actual lags in the availabilityof
information are likely to be longer, and because the establishments
sampled were most likely based on lists collectedin 1986 or earlier, and
may not have contained generics producing plants,to the extent that they
were new, rather than a re-direction of the outputof an existing plant.
14generics and because later on, when the incumbent raises its prices, it gets
inordinate weight in the fixed weight version. (The specific numbers for
these indexes for selected time periods after the entry of generics are
given in Tables 3a and 3b.)
The average price index is a price index that takes the FDA at its
word and treats all sourves of the pill as equivalent. It is constructed by
weighting the price series for the incumbent and entrants by their
respective quantity shares. The distance between the Tornqvist-Divisia and
this average price index provides, in a sense, a measure of the size of the
"purC generics problem: the problem raised by not comparing the new
goods to some appropriate base period price. As can be seen, it is quite
wide, with the average price index being about one-third to 45 percent
lower one to three years after entry.
In making an adjustment for the introduction of generics, two
decisions are crucial: (1) how is the reservation price to be computed, and
(2), what is to be done about diffusion, about the fact that spread of the
generic takes time and that today's switchers to the new versions are still
reacting to the existence of the differential itself, that they would have
switched even if prices had remained unchanged in the particular month.
As discussed above the uniform distribution is the simplest
assumption that one can make about the unobserved tastes for
brandedness", and appears to be reasonably consistent with the data. It
implies that average reservation price for wswitcherc is the avenge of the
generic and branded prices)6 The Paasche index based on this
calculation is denoted "Paasche (u)' in Table 3 and Figures 3 and 5. It
turns out that this is roughly equivalent to using the branded price in i-i
16 Forlogical consistency in the index number computations, we take
the average between the brand price in t-I and the generic in t.
15alone as a reservation price in aformula such as Fisher's Ideal or the
Tornqvist-Divisia price index,where the base period share of generics is
zero, and its effective weightis one-half of its comparison period share.
That is, either taking the actual price-differenceat one-half of its value, or
giving generics one-halfof their ultimate weight, gives essentially the
same result. (See the relevant rowsof Table 3, and Figures 3-5.)
Thatthe diffusion problem is important can be seenfrom Figures
6 and 7, which plot the market shareof generics (in quantity units) as a
function of the price differential (relative tothe branded prices)
=Pb 1•Sincethe price differential widens more or less
Pb
monotonicallywith time, these figures can be thought both as describing
diffusion and as an estimate of the cumulative distributionof the taste for
"brandedness." Note the significant upward movement inthe share of
generics in the first six months to a yearafter entry, without much of a
change in the price differential.
Tables 4a and 4b gives the results of a number of regressions
relating the share of generics in cephalexin and cephradineto current and
past price differentials and lagged sharesand compares several functional
forms. A number of things are worth noting about these results (and
associated computations):
1. Lagged response is important. The avenge pricedifferential
during the previous six-months comes in significantly, asdoes the
lagged share, indicating that diffusion is still goingafter six
months.'7
"Similar results can be gleaned from the Huzwitz and Caves, and
Grabowski and Vernon papers, where "time since introduction" is an
important explanatory variable for the market shareof generics.
162. The linearversion,implying a uniform distribution for F(ap),
fitsmarginally better than semi-log or the log-log (not shown)
versions.
3. The logit version gives a direct estimate of the elasticity of
substitution between the branded version and generics. It is about
2.1 for cephalexin and 3.4 for cephradine. This estimate, or the
log price-ratio versions which are consistent with a separable
addi-log demand structure (see Hausman et al. (1992)), can be
used for an alternative construction of the reservation price,
which is explored below.
4. Instrumenting the current price differential (and also the lagged
share), using a time trend (linear and quadratic), the overall
medical CPI and the number of generic entrants, does not change
these results significantly.
Tables 3a and 3b show the main results of using the various
possible approaches. In addition to using different index number formulae,
one can also allow for diffusion in two different ways: either one can
make the link later in the story, six months to a year later, allowing
thereby much of the early diffusion to be completed before evaluating the
direct contribution of generics (lines 9 -12in Table 3), or the index
number formula can be adjusted to reflect the assumption that those
shifting later on to generics, do so from the branded good, with an
average reservation price which is half-way between the branded and
generics prices (lines 6 and 7)I8Bothprocedures drop the computed
'°ThePaasche formula becomes 7',' = Q p6'+
Q:p:+Qp°+(Q-Q:)'
17price indexes further,with the second procedure doing it somewhat more
than the first. These indexes arealso plotted in Figures 3 and 5,where
(d)denotes"diffiision-aditlsted". Either way it is clear thatthe diffusion
question is of substantive importance,accounting for about one-third in
our total adjustmentof the "official' index.
These regression results also allow us toexamine the implications
of the remaining two approaches to the genericsproblem discussed above:
a CES utility function assumption,and the imputation of reservation
prices from an estimateddemand equation. Feenstra's (1992) approach to
the treatment of new goods assumes a CES utility orproduction function
for the separable nest of differentiated goods,and a reservation price of
infinity for goods not yet available. TheCES functional form produces a
finite gain in consumer surplus from the introductionof a new commodity
(variety) despite the infinitely high reservation price.This approach
requires knowledge of the elasticity ofsubstitution between the old and
new varieties. Applying this apparatus to our problemand using the
estimated elasticities of substitution in Table 4 of 2.1 for cephalexinand
3.4 for cephradine, yields estimates (listed in line 13of Tables 3a and 3b)
which are belowouraverage price index.'9 That is,the Feenstra index
shows even more of a price decline than is implied by the assumptionthat
where the assumption is made that total quantities are the same inboth
periods, and j,f =(p+p5I2. Thatis, "shifter? from the branded
version to the generic version are assumed to have experienced a price
decline of one half of the branded-generic differential also in periods
subsequent to the initial appearance of generics.
This computation is based on formula 4' in Feenstra and Markusen
1992. Formula 4 leads to nonsensical results. The computations are quite
sensitive to the particular assumption for a and the date at which the value
shares are evaluated.
18generics are perfect substitutesfor the branded versions? Thus our
approach is conservativerelative to the CES functional form approach.
Finally, the estimated demandrelationships in Tables 4a and 4b
can be used to inferthe reservation price, i.e. the price ratio that predicts
a zero share for generics, byextrapolation. Since most of the estimatesin
Tables 4a and 4b are based on sampleswhich include the initial point
(generic share=O, relative pricel),it is not surprising that the linear
versions of the equation yield an answerfor the reservation price close to
the brand price (a price ratio of I).The equations using the log of price
ratios yield reservation prices somewhat higherthan that, e.g. 1.3 for the
first estimate on the cephradine sectionof the table. Dropping the first
observation and re-estimating without it does not changematters much:
the estimated reservation prices aresomewhat higher, i.e. above the brand
price. This implies that our suggestedprocedure of takingthereservation
price at the midpoint betweenthe brand and the generics is conservative.
Both our attempt to estimate the reservation pricefrom the data by
extrapolation of the share equations, orthe use of the CES approximation
yields price indexes that woulddecline by even more than our suggested
compromise procedures.
We can summarize this section by noting that weeffectively
partition the distance between the consequencesof the two "extreme
treatments of generics (the BLS assumption of genericsbeing different
goods and their belated introductionwith fixed weights, and the
alternative extreme assumption of complete equivalence)into roughly four
parts. For cephalexin, the single largest part,slightly over 42 percent (by
The CES function guarantees that utilitywill increase simply as the
result of adding a new good.
19the end of three years after entry) is due to "standard"indexnumber
problems -lateinclusion of generics with too low and too fixed a weight.
Theremaining 58 percent,the distance between linking in generics
without giving thetransitionfrombrandeditemsany weight(line 2)and
thefullweighttreatment implicit inthe averagepriceformula (line 8) is
divided roughly in half by the suggested treatment of generics, with the
correct linkinginof generics at the beginning accountingforabout one-
third, and the estimated role of subsequent diffusion for two-thirds (lines
2-3, and 3-7). The other half, the distance from our "best" and lowest.
index (line 7) and the average price is consistent with the assumption used
in our calculations, that the "correct" reservation price is not the actual
price of the branded good, but the mid-point between it and its generic
rivals. The story for cephradine is similar but the magnitudes are
somewhat smaller, reflecting a smaller original price differential and the
lower market share of generics. The mnin point of this section is that the
correct treatment of generics is empirically important, not just at the
moment of their appearance but also through the later stages of their
diffusion.
20VI. Interim Conclusions
This is an interim report from an ongoing project. Onlytwo
episodes of patent expirationand entry by generics are examined in detail.
We are currently assembling a significantly largernumber of such
episodes, which should provide uswith more variability in the price
differential at entry and thus give us a betterchance to infer something
more specific about the shapeof the underlying distribution of tastes for
"brandedness". Efforts are also underway to use someof the implications
of theoretical models of incumbent and entrantinteraction to infer the
shape of the unobserved portionof this distribution. We are also planning
to explore the question of entry anddiffusion at the more detailed level of
particular presentations of a drug.While incomplete, our analysis to date
does indicate that the problems raised here maybe both pervasive and
important, and hence worthy offurther attention. Consider cephalexin: the
"IBLS" approach gives an increaseinthe wholesale price index of about
14% over the 45monthsobserved in our data; the opposite extreme,
assuming that branded and genericversions are perfect substitutes, gives a
price decline of 53%; andour preferred "adjusted Paasche"index falls by
48%. These are very substantial differences.
Official agencies could improve the accuracyof their price
measures by moving towards a more currentsampling of new products,
faster introduction, and more current weighting.As an alternative
compromise to existing procedures, new "gaining"varieties and outlets
could be introduced by comparing them directly to theincumbent ones,
with at least half of the apparent price difference beingtaken as "real".
21Appendix: Data Sources
The primary source of data for this study is audits of wholesale
transactions conducted by IMS America mc, a market research firm.
Sales revenues and quantities are derived from two sources: invoices ofa
panel of purchasers, and information provided by wholesalers. We
examine only 'systemic anti-infective" drugs for which the incumbent
firm's patent expired in the period of time covered by the machine-
w'1'ble ifie.
Individual items in the file are identified by
(a) "manuftcturer", which may be the actual producer of the drug,
or a firm specializing in distribution
(b) 'product name', either the brand name or the generic name of
the drug
(c) "description", a brief summary of the dosage, formulation, and
packaging of the item
Correspondences between brand namesandgeneric names were checked
using Drug Facts and Comparisons,a standardreference source used by
pharmacists.
For each drug, all items were classified using this information
into a "product" code, within which items are identical in terms of active
ingredient, formulation, dosage, and packaging. For cephalexin, there
were 38 distinct 'products', for example "250mg Tablets, 100 count", or
"Suspension, l2SmgISml,250ml,x 6". In a small number of cases, there
appear to be errors and ambiguities in labelling, making it difficult to
classify these items. For the two drugs examined here, this was not a
serious problem, and we are confident that our classification is accurate.
For other drugs, particularly those administered parenterally, thereare
serious problems in assigning items in the IMS file to homogeneous
"product" codes.
Within each product manufacturers were classified as "incumbent"or
"entrant', being careful to recognize that some "firms" are in fact
subsidiaries or divisions of a parentcompany. The total amount of the
active ingredient in each package was also computed, which when
multiplied by the number of packages on the invoice gives an alternate
measure of quantities.
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25flgure 1: Notes
The figure plots monthly data for one of themost popular presentations of
cephalexin, a bottle of 100 250mg capsules, for theperiod October 1984
to September 1990. The patent for cephalexinexpired in April 1987. The
data are broken down by incumbent, andtwo classes of entrants: "majors"
i.e. large R&D-performing firms, and"other", which are firms
specializing in the production of generics and performing littleproduct-
oriented R&D. (This 3-way classification isnot used elsewhere in the
paper. As the figure indicates, there is very little difference in theprices
charged by the two kinds of entrants, and the twogroups are combined
into a single "entrants" class.)
The solid line represents the incumbent, the brokenline represents the
"majors", and the dotted line represents the "other"group.
Panel (a) plots the revenue shares of the threegroups over time
Panel (b) plots the priceper bottle for each group over time (in current
dollars)
Panel (c) plots quantities for eachgroup over time (in lOOs of bottles)
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(u) denotes adjustment for uniform distribution of tastes for
brandedness, (d) denotes adjustment for diffusion. See text
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Figure 3.Cephalain: AlternativeTreatmems of Generics0.1'
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(u) denotes adjustment for uniform distributionof tastes for
brandedness, (d) denotes adjustment for diffusion. See text
and notes to Table 3.
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1.14 1. BL3 .99 .97 1.06 1.03
2. Tornqviat-Divisia .99 .95 .94 .88 .86
3. Puscbe (u) .91 .87 .86 .80
4. Fisher Ideal, p'np .93 .89 .66 .62
5. Tomqvist-Divisia, p'pb .91 .88 .87 .79
.66
6. TornqvisiDivisia(U), diffusion adj. .fl .63 .78 .68
.62
7. Panache (u). diffusion a4j. .91 .82 .77
.47
8. Avenge Price .83 .71 .63 .51
Semi-yearly
9. Panache (u) .85




12. Tornqvist-Divisia. /ap .82
13. WeecstrC CES index a=2.1 0.79 0.62 0.52
(u) signifiesp'
diffusion adjustment described in foothote x
Weenstn CESindcxiscOEDPUtCdIS P, P1-A'where Al/(1-s,) •s4boingthevalUe








1. BLS' 0.99 1.01 0.92 0.97 1.00
2. Totnqvist-Divisia 0.99 1.00 0.90 0.91 0.91
3. Paasche (u) 0.97 0.98 0.88 0.90 0.89
4. FisherIdeal,—p1 0.91 0.98 0.88 0.89 0.89
5. Tornqvist-Divisia p'=p 0.97 0.98 0.88 0.90 0.89
6. Tomqvist-Divisia(is). diiñasion adj. 0.97 0.97 0.8S 0.86 0.82
7. Puscbe (u). diffusion'4. 0.97 0.97 0.85 0.84 0.19
8. Average Price 0.96 0.94 0.80 0.79 0.70
Semi-yearly
9. Panache(u) 0.97






13. ?eensuf CES index o—3.4 0.95 0.93 0.11
(u)signilies p'(J''.P')I2
diffusion adjustment described in footnole x
-nil
WeenatrcCESindexiscompus.s F, - whereA a1/(1—:,),s,beingthevalue




























































































Notes: 'logs of price ratios
logit log (._L_) where £ is the quantity share of generics
1—s
priceratiop/ps







































































Notes: 'logs of price ratios
logit a log(.1.i_) where: is the quantity share of generics
price ratio — P/Pb
laggedavenge price ratio a (t (p)p),1 J16